         Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)
                            Algorithm Agility

Abstract

   This document updates the Public Key Cryptography for Initial
   Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT) standard (RFC 4556) to remove
   protocol structures tied to specific cryptographic algorithms. The
   PKINIT key derivation function is made negotiable, and the digest
   algorithms for signing the pre-authentication data and the client's
   X.509 certificates are made discoverable.

   These changes provide preemptive protection against vulnerabilities
   discovered in the future in any specific cryptographic algorithm and
   allow incremental deployment of newer algorithms.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

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1. Introduction

   The Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos
   (PKINIT) standard [RFC4556] defines several protocol structures that
   are either tied to SHA-1 [RFC6234] or do not support negotiation or
   discovery but are instead based on local policy:

   o The checksum algorithm in the authentication request is hardwired
      to use SHA-1.

   o The acceptable digest algorithms for signing the authentication
      data are not discoverable.

   o The key derivation function in Section 3.2.3.1 of [RFC4556] is
      hardwired to use SHA-1.

   o The acceptable digest algorithms for signing the client X.509
      certificates are not discoverable.

In August 2004, Xiaoyun Wang's research group reported MD4 [RFC6150]
collisions [WANG04], alongside attacks on later hash functions
including MD5 [RFC1321] and SHA-1 [RFC6234]. These attacks and their
consequences are discussed in [RFC6194]. These discoveries
challenged the security of protocols relying on the collision-
resistance properties of these hashes.

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called for action to
update existing protocols to provide crypto algorithm agility so that
protocols support multiple cryptographic algorithms (including hash
functions) and provide clean, tested transition strategies between
algorithms, as recommended by BCP 201 [RFC7696].

To address these concerns, new key derivation functions (KDFs),
identified by object identifiers, are defined. The PKINIT client
provides a list of KDFs in the request, and the Key Distribution
Center (KDC) picks one in the response. Thus, a mutually supported
KDF is negotiated.

Furthermore, structures are defined to allow the client to discover
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] digest algorithms
supported by the KDC for signing the pre-authentication data and the
client X.509 certificate.

2. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

3. paChecksum Agility

The paChecksum defined in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC4556] provides a
cryptographic binding between the client's pre-authentication data
and the corresponding Kerberos request body. This also prevents the
KDC-REQ body from being tampered with. SHA-1 is the only allowed
checksum algorithm defined in [RFC4556]. This facility relies on the
collision-resistance properties of the SHA-1 checksum [RFC6234].

When the reply key delivery mechanism is based on public key
encryption as described in Section 3.2.3.2 of [RFC4556], the
asChecksum in the KDC reply provides integrity protection for the
unauthenticated clear text in these messages and the binding between
the pre-authentication and the ticket request and response messages.
However, if the reply key delivery mechanism is based on the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement as described in Section 3.2.3.1 of [RFC4556],

the security provided by using SHA-1 in the paChecksum is weak, and
nothing else cryptographically binds the Authentication Service (AS)
request to the ticket response. In this case, the new KDF selected
by the KDC, as described in Section 6, provides the cryptographic
binding and integrity protection.

4. CMS Digest Algorithm Agility

   Section 3.2.2 of [RFC4556] is updated to add optional typed data to
   the KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED error. When a KDC
   implementation conforming to this specification returns this error
   code, it MAY include a list of supported CMS types signifying the
   digest algorithms supported by the KDC in decreasing order of
   preference. This is accomplished by including a
   TD_CMS_DATA_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS typed data element in the error data.

   td-cms-digest-algorithms INTEGER ::= 111

   The corresponding data for the TD_CMS_DATA_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS contains
   the TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA structure, which is ASN.1
   Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X680] [X690] encoded and is
   defined as follows:

   TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF
      AlgorithmIdentifier
          -- Contains the list of CMS algorithm [RFC5652]
          -- identifiers indicating the digest algorithms
          -- acceptable to the KDC for signing CMS data in
          -- decreasing order of preference.

   The algorithm identifiers in TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS identify the
   digest algorithms supported by the KDC.

   This information sent by the KDC via TD_CMS_DATA_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS
   can facilitate troubleshooting when none of the digest algorithms
   supported by the client is supported by the KDC.

5. X.509 Certificate Signer Algorithm Agility

   Section 3.2.2 of [RFC4556] is updated to add optional typed data to
   the KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_CERT_NOT_ACCEPTED error. When a KDC conforming
   to this specification returns this error, it MAY send a list of
   digest algorithms acceptable to the KDC for use by the certification
   authority (CA) in signing the client's X.509 certificate in
   decreasing order of preference. This is accomplished by including a
   TD_CERT_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS typed data element in the error data. The
   corresponding data contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of the TD-CERT-
   DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA structure defined as follows:

```
td-cert-digest-algorithms INTEGER ::= 112

TD-CERT-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA ::= SEQUENCE {
      allowedAlgorithms [0] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier,
                  -- Contains the list of CMS algorithm [RFC5652]
                  -- identifiers indicating the digest algorithms
                  -- that are used by the CA to sign the client's
                  -- X.509 certificate and are acceptable to the KDC
                  -- in the process of validating the client's X.509
                  -- certificate in decreasing order of
                  -- preference.
      rejectedAlgorithm [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                  -- This identifies the digest algorithm that was
                  -- used to sign the client's X.509 certificate and
                  -- has been rejected by the KDC in the process of
                  -- validating the client's X.509 certificate
                  -- [RFC5280].
      ...
}
```

The KDC fills in the allowedAlgorithm field with the list of
algorithm [RFC5652] identifiers indicating digest algorithms that are
used by the CA to sign the client's X.509 certificate and are
acceptable to the KDC in the process of validating the client's X.509
certificate in decreasing order of preference. The rejectedAlgorithm
field identifies the signing algorithm for use in signing the
client's X.509 certificate that has been rejected by the KDC in the
process of validating the client's certificate [RFC5280].

6. KDF Agility

   Section 3.2.3.1 of [RFC4556] is updated to define additional key
   derivation functions (KDFs) to derive a Kerberos protocol key based
   on the secret value generated by the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
   Section 3.2.1 of [RFC4556] is updated to add a new field to the
   AuthPack structure to indicate which new KDFs are supported by the
   client. Section 3.2.3 of [RFC4556] is updated to add a new field to
   the DHRepInfo structure to indicate which KDF is selected by the KDC.

   The KDF algorithm described in this document (based on [SP80056A])
   can be implemented using any cryptographic hash function.

A new KDF for PKINIT usage is identified by an object identifier.
The following KDF object identifiers are defined:

```
id-pkinit OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
          security(5) kerberosv5(2) pkinit (3) }
    -- Defined in RFC 4556 and quoted here for the reader.

id-pkinit-kdf OBJECT IDENTIFIER     ::= { id-pkinit kdf(6) }
    -- PKINIT KDFs

id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER
    ::= { id-pkinit-kdf sha1(1) }
    -- SP800-56A ASN.1 structured hash-based KDF using SHA-1

id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER
    ::= { id-pkinit-kdf sha256(2) }
    -- SP800-56A ASN.1 structured hash-based KDF using SHA-256

id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER
    ::= { id-pkinit-kdf sha512(3) }
    -- SP800-56A ASN.1 structured hash-based KDF using SHA-512

id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER
    ::= { id-pkinit-kdf sha384(4) }
    -- SP800-56A ASN.1 structured hash-based KDF using SHA-384
```

Where id-pkinit is defined in [RFC4556]. All key derivation
functions specified above use the one-step key derivation method
described in Section 5.8.2.1 of [SP80056A], choosing the ASN.1 format
for FixedInfo, and Section 4.1 of [SP80056C], choosing option 1 for
the auxiliary function H. id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1 uses SHA-1 [RFC6234]
as the hash function. id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256, id-pkinit-kdf-ah-
sha356, and id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512 use SHA-256 [RFC6234], SHA-384
[RFC6234], and SHA-512 [RFC6234], respectively.

To name the input parameters, an abbreviated version of the key
derivation method is described below.

1. reps = ceiling(L/H_outputBits)

2. Initialize a 32-bit, big-endian bit string counter as 1.

3. For i = 1 to reps by 1, do the following:

    1. Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo).

    2. Increment counter (not to exceed 2^32-1)

   4. Set key_material = Hash1 || Hash2 || ... so that the length of
       key_material is L bits, truncating the last block as necessary.

   5. The above KDF produces a bit string of length L in bits as the
       keying material. The AS reply key is the output of random-to-
       key() [RFC3961], using that keying material as the input.

   The input parameters for these KDFs are provided as follows:

   o H_outputBits is 160 bits for id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1, 256 bits for
      id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256, 384 bits for id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha384, and
      512 bits for id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512.

   o max_H_inputBits is 2^{64}.

   o The secret value (Z) is the shared secret value generated by the
      Diffie-Hellman exchange. The Diffie-Hellman shared value is first
      padded with leading zeros such that the size of the secret value
      in octets is the same as that of the modulus, then represented as
      a string of octets in big-endian order.

   o The key data length (L) is the key-generation seed length in bits
      [RFC3961] for the Authentication Service (AS) reply key. The
      enctype of the AS reply key is selected according to [RFC4120].

   o The algorithm identifier (algorithmID) input parameter is the
      identifier of the respective KDF. For example, this is id-pkinit-
      kdf-ah-sha1 if the KDF uses SHA-1 as the hash.

   o The initiator identifier (partyUInfo) contains the ASN.1 DER
      encoding of the KRB5PrincipalName [RFC4556] that identifies the
      client as specified in the AS-REQ [RFC4120] in the request.

   o The recipient identifier (partyVInfo) contains the ASN.1 DER
      encoding of the KRB5PrincipalName [RFC4556] that identifies the
      ticket-granting server (TGS) as specified in the AS-REQ [RFC4120]
      in the request.

   o The supplemental public information (suppPubInfo) is the ASN.1 DER
      encoding of the PkinitSuppPubInfo structure, as defined later in
      this section.

   o The supplemental private information (suppPrivInfo) is absent.

OtherInfo is the ASN.1 DER encoding of the following sequence:

```
OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        algorithmID   AlgorithmIdentifier,
        partyUInfo    [0] OCTET STRING,
        partyVInfo    [1] OCTET STRING,
        suppPubInfo   [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
        suppPrivInfo  [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
```

The PkinitSuppPubInfo structure is defined as follows:

```
PkinitSuppPubInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        enctype          [0] Int32,
            -- The enctype of the AS reply key.
        as-REQ           [1] OCTET STRING,
            -- The DER encoding of the AS-REQ [RFC4120] from the
            -- client.
        pk-as-rep        [2] OCTET STRING,
            -- The DER encoding of the PA-PK-AS-REP [RFC4556] in the
            -- KDC reply.
        ...
}
```

The PkinitSuppPubInfo structure contains mutually known public information specific to the authentication exchange. The enctype field is the enctype of the AS reply key as selected according to [RFC4120]. The as-REQ field contains the DER encoding of the AS-REQ type [RFC4120] in the request sent from the client to the KDC. Note that the as-REQ field does not include the wrapping 4-octet length when TCP is used. The pk-as-rep field contains the DER encoding of the PA-PK-AS-REP [RFC4556] type in the KDC reply. The PkinitSuppPubInfo provides a cryptographic binding between the pre-authentication data and the corresponding ticket request and response, thus addressing the concerns described in Section 3.

The KDF is negotiated between the client and the KDC. The client sends an unordered set of supported KDFs in the request, and the KDC picks one from the set in the reply.

To accomplish this, the AuthPack structure in [RFC4556] is extended
as follows:

```
AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
        pkAuthenticator   [0] PKAuthenticator,
        clientPublicValue [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
        supportedCMSTypes [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
                OPTIONAL,
        clientDHNonce     [3] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
        ...,
        supportedKDFs     [4] SEQUENCE OF KDFAlgorithmId OPTIONAL,
            -- Contains an unordered set of KDFs supported by the
            -- client.
        ...
}

KDFAlgorithmId ::= SEQUENCE {
        kdf-id            [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
            -- The object identifier of the KDF
        ...
}
```

The new supportedKDFs field contains an unordered set of KDFs
supported by the client.

The KDFAlgorithmId structure contains an object identifier that
identifies a KDF. The algorithm of the KDF and its parameters are
defined by the corresponding specification of that KDF.

The DHRepInfo structure in [RFC4556] is extended as follows:

```
DHRepInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        dhSignedData        [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
        serverDHNonce       [1] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
        ...,
        kdf                 [2] KDFAlgorithmId OPTIONAL,
            -- The KDF picked by the KDC.
        ...
}
```

The new kdf field in the extended DHRepInfo structure identifies the
KDF picked by the KDC. If the supportedKDFs field is present in the
request, a KDC conforming to this specification MUST choose one of
the KDFs supported by the client and indicate its selection in the
kdf field in the reply. If the supportedKDFs field is absent in the
request, the KDC MUST omit the kdf field in the reply and use the key

derivation function from Section 3.2.3.1 of [RFC4556]. If none of
the KDFs supported by the client is acceptable to the KDC, the KDC
MUST reply with the new error code KDC_ERR_NO_ACCEPTABLE_KDF:

   o KDC_ERR_NO_ACCEPTABLE_KDF 100

If the client fills the supportedKDFs field in the request but the
kdf field in the reply is not present, the client can deduce that the
KDC is not updated to conform with this specification, or that the
exchange was subjected to a downgrade attack. It is a matter of
local policy on the client whether to reject the reply when the kdf
field is absent in the reply; if compatibility with non-updated KDCs
is not a concern, the reply should be rejected.

Implementations conforming to this specification MUST support
id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256.

7. Interoperability

   An old client interoperating with a new KDC will not recognize a
   TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA element in a
   KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED error or a TD-CERT-DIGEST-
   ALGORITHMS-DATA element in a KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_CERT_NOT_ACCEPTED
   error. Because the error data is encoded as typed data, the client
   will ignore the unrecognized elements.

   An old KDC interoperating with a new client will not include a
   TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA element in a
   KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED error or a TD-CERT-DIGEST-
   ALGORITHMS-DATA element in a KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_CERT_NOT_ACCEPTED
   error. To the client, this appears just as if a new KDC elected not
   to include a list of digest algorithms.

   An old client interoperating with a new KDC will not include the
   supportedKDFs field in the request. The KDC MUST omit the kdf field
   in the reply and use the [RFC4556] KDF as expected by the client or
   reject the request if local policy forbids use of the old KDF.

   A new client interoperating with an old KDC will include the
   supportedKDFs field in the request; this field will be ignored as an
   unknown extension by the KDC. The KDC will omit the kdf field in the
   reply and will use the [RFC4556] KDF. The client can deduce from the
   omitted kdf field that the KDC is not updated to conform to this
   specification or that the exchange was subjected to a downgrade
   attack. The client MUST use the [RFC4556] KDF or reject the reply if
   local policy forbids the use of the old KDF.

8. Test Vectors

   This section contains test vectors for the KDF defined above.

8.1. Common Inputs

Z: Length = 256 bytes, Hex Representation = (All Zeros)
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 000000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 000000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 000000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 000000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 000000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 000000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 000000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 000000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

client: Length = 9 bytes, ASCII Representation = lha@SU.SE

server: Length = 18 bytes, ASCII Representation = krbtgt/SU.SE@SU.SE

as-req: Length = 10 bytes, Hex Representation =
AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA AAAA

pk-as-rep: Length = 9 bytes, Hex Representation =
BBBBBBBB BBBBBBBB BB

ticket: Length = 55 bytes, Hex Representation =
61353033 A0030201 05A1071B 0553552E 5345A210 300EA003 020101A1 0730051B
036C6861 A311300F A0030201 12A20804 0668656A 68656A

8.2. Test Vector for SHA-1, enctype 18

8.2.1. Specific Inputs

   algorithm-id: (id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1) Length = 8 bytes, Hex
   Representation = 2B060105 02030601

   enctype: (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96) Length = 1 byte, Decimal
   Representation = 18

8.2.2. Outputs

 key-material: Length = 32 bytes, Hex Representation =
 E6AB38C9 413E035B B079201E D0B6B73D 8D49A814 A737C04E E6649614 206F73AD

 key: Length = 32 bytes, Hex Representation =
 E6AB38C9 413E035B B079201E D0B6B73D 8D49A814 A737C04E E6649614 206F73AD

8.3. Test Vector for SHA-256, enctype 18

8.3.1. Specific Inputs

   algorithm-id: (id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256) Length = 8 bytes, Hex
   Representation = 2B060105 02030602

   enctype: (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96) Length = 1 byte, Decimal
   Representation = 18

8.3.2. Outputs

 key-material: Length = 32 bytes, Hex Representation =
 77EF4E48 C420AE3F EC75109D 7981697E ED5D295C 90C62564 F7BFD101 FA9bC1D5

 key: Length = 32 bytes, Hex Representation =
 77EF4E48 C420AE3F EC75109D 7981697E ED5D295C 90C62564 F7BFD101 FA9bC1D5

8.4. Test Vector for SHA-512, enctype 16

8.4.1. Specific Inputs

   algorithm-id: (id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512) Length = 8 bytes, Hex
   Representation = 2B060105 02030603

   enctype: (des3-cbc-sha1-kd) Length = 1 byte, Decimal
   Representation = 16

8.4.2. Outputs

   key-material: Length = 24 bytes, Hex Representation =
   D3C78A79 D65213EF E9A826F7 5DFB01F7 2362FB16 FB01DAD6

   key: Length = 32 bytes, Hex Representation =
   D3C78A79 D65213EF E9A826F7 5DFB01F7 2362FB16 FB01DAD6

9. Security Considerations

   This document describes negotiation of checksum types, key derivation
   functions, and other cryptographic functions. If a given negotiation
   is unauthenticated, care must be taken to accept only secure values;
   to do otherwise allows an active attacker to perform a downgrade
   attack.

   The discovery method described in Section 4 uses a Kerberos error
   message, which is unauthenticated in a typical exchange. An attacker
   may attempt to downgrade a client to a weaker CMS type by forging a
   KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED error. It is a matter of

local policy whether a client accepts a downgrade to a weaker CMS
type and whether the KDC accepts the weaker CMS type. A client may
reasonably assume that the real KDC implements all hash functions
used in the client's X.509 certificate, and so the client may refuse
attempts to downgrade to weaker hash functions.

The discovery method described in Section 5 also uses a Kerberos
error message. An attacker may attempt to downgrade a client to a
certificate using a weaker signing algorithm by forging a
KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_CERT_NOT_ACCEPTED error. It is a matter of local
policy whether a client accepts a downgrade to a weaker certificate
and whether the KDC accepts the weaker certificate. This attack is
only possible if the client device possesses multiple client
certificates of varying strengths.

In the KDF negotiation method described in Section 6, the client
supportedKDFs value is protected by the signature on the
signedAuthPack field in the request. If this signature algorithm is
vulnerable to collision attacks, an attacker may attempt to downgrade
the negotiation by substituting an AuthPack with a different or
absent supportedKDFs value, using a PKINIT freshness token [RFC8070]
to partially control the legitimate AuthPack value. A client that is
performing anonymous PKINIT [RFC8062] does not sign the AuthPack, so
an attacker can easily remove the supportedKDFs value in this case.
Finally, the kdf field in the DHRepInfo of the KDC response is
unauthenticated and could be altered or removed by an attacker,
although this alteration will likely result in a decryption failure
by the client rather than a successful downgrade. It is a matter of
local policy whether a client accepts a downgrade to the old KDF and
whether the KDC allows the use of the old KDF.

The paChecksum field, which binds the client pre-authentication data
to the Kerberos request body, remains fixed at SHA-1. If an attacker
substitutes a different request body using an attack against SHA-1 (a
second preimage attack is likely required as the attacker does not
control any part of the legitimate request body), the KDC will not
detect the substitution. Instead, if a new KDF is negotiated, the
client will detect the substitution by failing to decrypt the reply.

An attacker may attempt to impersonate the KDC to the client via an
attack on the hash function used in the dhSignedData signature,
substituting the attacker's subjectPublicKey for the legitimate one
without changing the hash value. It is a matter of local policy
which hash function the KDC uses in its signature and which hash
functions the client will accept in the KDC signature. A KDC may
reasonably assume that the client implements all hash functions used
in the KDF algorithms listed the supportedKDFs field of the request.

10. IANA Considerations

   IANA has made the following assignments in the Kerberos "Pre-
   authentication and Typed Data" registry created by Section 7.1 of RFC
   6113.

                    TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS   111   [RFC8636]
                    TD-CERT-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS   112   [RFC8636]

11. References

11.1. Normative References

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Appendix A. PKINIT ASN.1 Module

```
   KerberosV5-PK-INIT-Agility-SPEC {
         iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) pkinit(5) agility (1)
   } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

   IMPORTS
      AlgorithmIdentifier, SubjectPublicKeyInfo
         FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso (1)
            identified-organization (3) dod (6) internet (1)
            security (5) mechanisms (5) pkix (7) id-mod (0)
            id-pkix1-explicit (18) }
            -- As defined in RFC 5280.

      Ticket, Int32, Realm, EncryptionKey, Checksum
         FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
            dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
            modules(4) krb5spec2(2) }
            -- as defined in RFC 4120.

      PKAuthenticator, DHNonce, id-pkinit
         FROM KerberosV5-PK-INIT-SPEC {
            iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
            security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) pkinit(5) };
            -- as defined in RFC 4556.

   id-pkinit-kdf OBJECT IDENTIFIER      ::= { id-pkinit kdf(6) }
      -- PKINIT KDFs

   id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      ::= { id-pkinit-kdf sha1(1) }
      -- SP800-56A ASN.1 structured hash-based KDF using SHA-1

   id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      ::= { id-pkinit-kdf sha256(2) }
      -- SP800-56A ASN.1 structured hash-based KDF using SHA-256

   id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      ::= { id-pkinit-kdf sha512(3) }
      -- SP800-56A ASN.1 structured hash-based KDF using SHA-512

   id-pkinit-kdf-ah-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      ::= { id-pkinit-kdf sha384(4) }
      -- SP800-56A ASN.1 structured hash-based KDF using SHA-384
```

```
    TD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF
        AlgorithmIdentifier
            -- Contains the list of CMS algorithm [RFC5652]
            -- identifiers indicating the digest algorithms
            -- acceptable to the KDC for signing CMS data in
            -- decreasing order of preference.

    TD-CERT-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS-DATA ::= SEQUENCE {
            allowedAlgorithms [0] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier,
                -- Contains the list of CMS algorithm [RFC5652]
                -- identifiers indicating the digest algorithms
                -- that are used by the CA to sign the client's
                -- X.509 certificate and are acceptable to the KDC
                -- in the process of validating the client's X.509
                -- certificate in decreasing order of
                -- preference.
            rejectedAlgorithm [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
                -- This identifies the digest algorithm that was
                -- used to sign the client's X.509 certificate and
                -- has been rejected by the KDC in the process of
                -- validating the client's X.509 certificate
                -- [RFC5280].
            ...
    }

    OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
            algorithmID    AlgorithmIdentifier,
            partyUInfo     [0] OCTET STRING,
            partyVInfo     [1] OCTET STRING,
            suppPubInfo    [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
            suppPrivInfo   [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
    }

    PkinitSuppPubInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
            enctype          [0] Int32,
                -- The enctype of the AS reply key.
            as-REQ           [1] OCTET STRING,
                -- The DER encoding of the AS-REQ [RFC4120] from the
                -- client.
            pk-as-rep        [2] OCTET STRING,
                -- The DER encoding of the PA-PK-AS-REP [RFC4556] in the
                -- KDC reply.
            ...
    }
```

```
AuthPack ::= SEQUENCE {
        pkAuthenticator    [0] PKAuthenticator,
        clientPublicValue  [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
        supportedCMSTypes   [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
                  OPTIONAL,
        clientDHNonce      [3] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
        ...,
        supportedKDFs      [4] SEQUENCE OF KDFAlgorithmId OPTIONAL,
            -- Contains an unordered set of KDFs supported by the
            -- client.
        ...
}

KDFAlgorithmId ::= SEQUENCE {
        kdf-id             [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
            -- The object identifier of the KDF
        ...
}

DHRepInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        dhSignedData       [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING,
        serverDHNonce      [1] DHNonce OPTIONAL,
        ...,
        kdf                [2] KDFAlgorithmId OPTIONAL,
            -- The KDF picked by the KDC.
        ...
}
END
```

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